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We analyze a two-stage game where capacity-constrained electricity
generators ﬁrst choose how much capacity they make available and then
compete in a uniform-price auction. We study how capacity withhold-
ing can be used strategically to enforce market power and how uniform
auctions in the price game change the results of capacity constrained
competition models. The uniform auction procedure gives strong in-
centives to capacity restriction. At equilibrium, however, power short-
age never occurs.
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Since the 90’s, an increasing number of countries have organized wholesale
markets for electricity. Although the market rules may diﬀer from country
to country, the trading of electricity is generally based on uniform price
auction mechanisms, that is a system where every active producer receives
the same price for every unit of output he is called for, as long as his bids
were lower than the clearing price computed by the market operator (see
von der Fehr and Harbord (1998) and Newbery (1999) for a comprehensive
description of several international examples).
Though auctions in electricity markets have already been studied by
several economists, yet an important feature of spot trading is the capac-
ity availability decision. In fact, for technical reasons, such as equipment
maintenance or failures, the installed capacity may not work at maximum
operating level and the spot market rules oblige generators to announce
which plants they are willing to use together with their oﬀer prices. Beside
technical reasons, the so-called “capacity declarations” also oﬀer a strate-
gic instrument for ﬁrms: by restricting capacity, operators can beneﬁtf r o m
scarcity rents.1 As Green (2004) explain: "[...] The term “withholding”
is often used to describe the way in which generators could exploit market
power. “Economic withholding” implies that a plant would not oﬀer its
output as soon as the market price was high enough to cover its costs of
doing so, but would wait until the price had risen above its costs. “Physical
withholding” implies that the plant’s output is not made available to the
market at any price. In both cases, the plants that are withheld from the
market will generate less, and are likely to make less money, but the strat-
egy can increase the company’s proﬁts by raising the price received by its
other units." Our aim is to show that endogenizing capacity as a strategic
variable not only takes into account real technological constraints, but also
helps to understand when withholding production results in pricing above
marginal cost, a possible outcome of the uniform price auction. Thus we
study a two-stage game where capacity constrained electricity generators
ﬁrst choose how much capacity they make available and then compete in a
uniform-price auction.
Assessing whether generators withhold capacity is an intriguing issue for
real electricity markets, though proving it is a diﬃcult task. Wolak and
Patrick (1997) study the UK Pool during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of its opera-
tion and aﬃrm that capacity bids are a more “high-powered” instrument
than price bids to manipulate spot market prices. By analyzing half-hourly
bids and availability declarations, they conclude that National Power and
PowerGen were strategically withholding capacity to increase prices. How-
1Notice that short-term capacity availability decisions are substantially diﬀerent from
the long-term investment as modelled by von der Fehr and Harbord (1997), Castro-
Rodriguez et alii (2001).
2ever, Green (2004) argues that availability ﬁgures do not provide conclusive
evidence of strategic capacity withholding by British generators from 1990
to 2001,.and concludes that to look for this kind of evidence, prices and
generation patterns must be examined.
Joskow and Kahn (2001) perform a simulation analysis showing that
capacity withholding in the Californian spot market during the summer 2000
can explain - at least partially - the observed price increase. They ﬁnd a
substantial gap between maximum possible levels of generation and observed
levels at peak hours. This gap cannot be explained by the California System
Operator’s requirements for ancillary services or by reasonable estimates of
forced outages. Joskow and Kahn conclude that there is suﬃcient empirical
evidence that the high observed prices reﬂect market power exercised by
withholding capacity. On the contrary, Harvey and Hogan (2001a) cast
some doubts about the empirical analyses assessing strategic withholding by
the Californian companies; in particular, they criticize Joskow and Kahn’s
work in that they use publicly available data only. According to Harvey
and Hogan, the public information do not reﬂect the real status of capacity
usage and do not show whether capacity has been used to generate energy,
or to provide ancillary services, or to alleviate congestion and to balance
generation and load, as the system operator might require. Harvey and
Hogan’s view is not shared by the California Public Utilities Commission,
whose investigation has concluded that ﬁve independent power producers
- Duke, Dynergy, Mirant, Reliant and AES/Williams - withheld capacity
from their California plants.2
Several theoretical papers show that generators are able to keep whole-
sale prices high as compared to their generation costs.3 Von der Fehr and
Harbord (1993) develop a sealed-bid multiple-unit auction model with par-
ticular reference to the UK Pool operating during the 90’s. They show that
ineﬃcient pricing is the most likely outcome even if there is no collusive
behavior. Motivated by the recent reform of the UK system, where each
active producer is paid his own bid, andb yt h eC a l i f o r n i a nd e b a t ei nf a v o r
of price-diﬀerentiated mechanisms, Fabra et alii (2005) generalize the model
proposed by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) and compare discriminatory
and uniform auctions in terms of prices and productive eﬃciency. Through
comparative statics results, the authors show that the pricing mechanism
in the electricity industry is heavily aﬀected by the existence of capacity
constraints in generation, like in Bertrand-Edgeworth models.4 Fabra et alii
2California Public Utilities Commission, “Wholesale Generator Investigation Report”,
available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov.
3We do not refer here to the set of studies that use standard Industrial Organization
models of competition based on continuous and diﬀerentiable cost functions, like Bolle
(1992), Green and Newbery (1992), Green (1996, 1999), Newbery (1998), Baldick and
Hogan (2001).
4The impact of ﬁrms’ limited generation capacity on bidding strategies is further ex-
3(2005) provide much of the results we use to characterize the equilibrium of
the price game, at which capacity are exogenously given.
The strategic use of available capacity in two-stage games with uniform
auctions has been analyzed by Le Coq (2002) in a duopoly model and by
Ubeda (2004) in the more general uniform versus discriminatory auction
debate. Considering all possible cost/available capacity conﬁgurations, both
Le Coq and Ubeda conclude that ﬁrms will generally have incentives to
withhold capacity. However, our paper diﬀe r sf r o mt h e i r si nt h a tw ef o c u s
on a speciﬁc cost/installed capacity conﬁguration. In our model, a generator
is not obliged to declare all installed capacity as available, but decides on the
amount of MW of electricity that is available. Hence the available capacity
is an endogenous variable while the installed one is exogenous. The analysis
of installed capacities, which may be larger than the “available” capacities,
allow to explain clearly whether generators exert market power by declaring
unavailable some production units.
Although we ﬁnd multiple subgame perfect equilibria that cannot be
eliminated by Pareto-dominance, all the outcomes are characterized by mar-
ket price at the highest attainable value and most of them by production
below installed capacity. Nevertheless, there is no power shortage, as long
as the penalty rules that apply to generators when excess demand occurs do
not give the wrong incentive to decrease capacity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to model setting.
After a brief explanation of the price game (Section 3), we analyze the
capacity choice (Section 4). Section 5 compares our results to those of
capacity-constrained competition models and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model setting
To analyze competition in electricity markets, it is necessary to clarify the
assumptions on supply and demand, but also on market rules and regulatory
instruments. In what follows, we detail our hypotheses: Section 2.1 describes
supply and demand characteristics, while Section 2.2 is devoted to market
rules.
plored by Otto López (2000) who analyses a market where generators, submitting diﬀerent
bids for each next-day hourly market (like in Spain since1998), face a quasi certain de-
mand. Otto López shows that, for a certain range of low costs, the ﬁrms bid strictly
less under capacity constraint than in the unconstrained case. The expected equilibrium
price, however, will not necessarily be close to the marginal cost because of capacity con-
straints. García-Martin (1999) refers to the same type of model to analyze the eﬀects
of the stranded costs investments recovrement and shows that this mechanism acts as a
countervailing force to market power and high prices.
42.1 Supply and demand characteristics
Supply There are two generators labeled a and b, with installed capacity
Ki (i = a,b). The technology exhibits constant marginal costs ci (i = a,b)
for production levels less than capacity, while production above capacity is
inﬁnitely costly. Arbitrarily, we assume ca <c b and, whenever applicable,
we use the parameter ζ =
ˆ p−ca
ˆ p−cb > 1 to measure ﬁrm a’s cost advantage (ˆ p
is the price cap; see Section 2.2 below). We also assume- for pure conve-
nience - asymmetric installed capacities Ka > Kb, which means that the
low generation-cost ﬁrm is also the one with the higher installed capac-
ity. An example is given by hydro versus thermal electricity. Costs as well
as installed capacity are common knowledge, which is broadly the case in
wholesale electricity markets.
Each generator is not obliged to declare capacity as totally available:
when ﬁrm i announces that Ki(≤ Ki) is available, she must be ready to
produce up to Ki if the market operator dispatches her. The technical
reason is that it is costly to prepare and to operate a generation plant. Since
withholding capacity can also enforce anticompetitive behavior, we assume
that ﬁrm i incurs no cost in declaring the availability of Ki.G e n e r a t i o n
costs will only be paid for the output eﬀectively produced.
We also assume that power shortage can occur only if provoked by ﬁrms:
the installed capacity is suﬃcient to provide the highest demand level.
Demand Demand D is totally inelastic: this mainly reﬂects the fact that
hourly demand forecast announced by the Independent System Operator5
(henceforth, ISO) are ﬁxed quantities.6
For a given demand D, supply can appear as small or large ex-ante
or ex-post. Ex-ante, demand is to be compared with the real or technical
or natural generation capacities Ka and Kb. Ex-post, demand has to be
compared with the alleged or declared or strategic capacities Ka and Kb.
Of course, because of the constraints Ki ≤ Ki for i = a,b,t h ee x - p o s tr e g i m e
can only be a subset of the ex-ante regime.
2.2 Market rules
Bid Formats In energy markets, generators’ bids must respect the legal
format imposed by the system operator. For instance, price announcements
are limited to a ﬁnite number of values by pre-deﬁned ticks. On the con-
trary, no legal constraint is imposed on the quantity of energy the generator
5As we do not consider transmission problems, there is no reason to distinguish be-
tween the system operator, usually in charge of transmission congestion, and the market
operator.
6Eligible customers are allowed to announce demand bids, which represent their maxi-
mum individual willingness to pay. As a result, the aggregate demand should exhibit some
elasticity, but actually, observation shows that the price elasticity of demand is very low.
5is willing to provide; but, as we have said, technical constraints as start-up
cost or multi-unit equipment may cause discontinuity in the production de-
cisions. We neglect these legal and technical constraints and consider price
and capacity as continuous variables, ruling out the problem of optimization
in integer numbers.
Price-cap We suppose that there exists an upper limit to bids, denoted by
ˆ p that can be interpreted as a regulated maximum price or as the reservation
price of consumers as estimated by the ISO.
Determination of the system marginal price We limit our attention
to uniform-price auctions; at equilibrium, all participants are paid the same
unit price, that is the clearing price or the “system marginal price” (SMP).
When bids are ordered by increasing values, the SMP is the value of the
last bid necessary to equate demand and supply. When demand is low, the
clearing price is the bid Bi ﬁxed by the low bidder. For a medium demand,
the clearing price is ﬁxed by the ﬁrm with the higher generation capacity.
With a high demand, the equilibrium price is the bid ﬁx e db yt h eh i g h
bidder. It results that, depending on the declared capacities Ka and Kb,
and depending on the demand value D,w eh a v ev e r yd i ﬀerent conditions
of price competition. In all cases, however, demand is allocated ﬁrst to the
lower bidder and the higher bidder serves the residual, if any.
Tie-breaking rules If ﬁrms announce the same price p, we assume that
generators are despatched proportionally to their available capacity, which
means that the gross revenue of ﬁrm i is pD
Ki P
j Kj
.7 We also consider, as an
alternative rule, the eﬃcient tie-breaking mechanism, under which whenever
the two generators submit equal oﬀer prices, the low cost ﬁrm is called into
operation ﬁrst, and the competitor is left serving the residual demand.
Shortage penalty What occurs in the DE regime where demand cannot
be totally supplied? Under pure market mechanisms, the price should be ˆ p,
each ﬁrm i receiving revenue ˆ pKi, and demand being rationed. Shortages in
California during Summer 2000 have shown that the political consequences
of black-outs are dramatic, hence market rules should be designed to avoid
them. In fact, the so-called “load-serving entities”, responsible for retailing,
must pay some penalties for unserved demand once the real-time dispatch
has occurred (Crampton and Sotft, 2005). This is a motivation to analyze
the impact of alternative penalty rules on ﬁrms’ withholding strategies, as-
suming that generators are responsible for serving ﬁnal demand, since in our
model we do not consider distributors. We assume that, when a shortage
7This is for instance the rule used by the Spanish ISO.
6occurs, the ISO requires ﬁrms to sell all their available capacity at a price
e p ≤ b p and to pay a ﬁxed penalty S.
Notice that our hypothesis on the shortage penalty is diﬀerent from
the so-called capacity payments, whose impact is considered, for instance,
in von der Fehr et alii (1997). The capacity payment rule makes ﬁrms’
proﬁt an increasing function of ﬁrm’s own capacity and a decreasing function
of the diﬀerence between demand and the total declared capacity. This
reward scheme can create incentives for collusion and free riding8,w h e r e a s
our penalty rule makes withholding unattractive.
2.3 Timing of the game
In spot markets, suppliers submit pairs (Bi,K i) that give the minimum
unit price Bi at which supplier i is willing to produce up to the associ-
ated quantity Ki MW. However, if price bids can adjust very quickly to
any information relevant to competition strategies, capacity cannot. Due to
technological inﬂexibility, ﬁrms must plan their capacity availability before
submitting simultaneously price and quantity bids. Hence we assume that,
even if market rules oblige generators to submit day-ahead price and quan-
tity bids at the same time, ﬁrms actually decide quantities before deciding
on prices. The bidder can commit to a price almost instantaneously while
he needs technical lags before committing to capacities. For this reason, we
consider realistic to keep separate the decision on Ki and the decision on
Bi. Additionally, we assume that the choice of Ki is observable by j before
choosing Bj. This can be justiﬁed by bidders’ expertise and by the informa-
tion disseminated by market operators.9 We focus on capacity availability
decisions, neglecting the duration of suppliers’ oﬀer prices. The latter topic
has been quite extensively studied in the literature on electricity auctions
(see in particular García-Diaz and Marín, 2003 and Fabra et alii, 2005).
At the time where generators decide on the capacity availability and
price bids, demand forecast is a crucial variable. We assume that ﬁrms
know the value of D when choosing capacities and prices; therefore, they
8“Capacity payments” are a feature of some electricity systems including Spain, Ar-
gentina and Australia. However, recently they have been widely criticised (see Newbery,
1997, Wolak and Patrick, 1997) and abandoned in the newly-designed England and Wales
pool. In order to avoid shortage, other systems, as the New-York ISO and the PJM In-
terconnection, have organised decentralised capacity markets and imposed capacity oblig-
ations (and penalties if those obligations are unattended) to load-serving entities. The
Colombian ISO is considering to organise reliability contracts which include penalties for
those bids that are not backed by adequate generation capacity.
9For instance, since July 2001, the Californian ISO makes publicly available a list of all
power plants located in the State that are not operational due to planned or unplanned
outages. The snapshot of the “non-operational generating units” is updated four times a
day, on the basis of the information communicated by generators. The list comprises very
detailed information on the unavailable plants, including the name of the generation unit
which is being reported upon.
7play a two-stage game:
i) ﬁrms a and b announce the available capacities Ka ≤ Ka and Kb ≤ Kb;
ii) knowing these capacities, the ﬁrms submit their bids Ba and Bb.
Given the capacity and price bids, the ISO matches demand and supply
and generators are paid.
3 Price competition
In this section, we determine the price equilibria corresponding to each
regime of demand, given the available capacity declared by the generators.
This is a necessary step before we can focus on the stage of competition in
capacity. Lemma 1 describes the equilibrium proﬁts of the price competition
game that we consider at the capacity choice stage, most of the results lean
on Proposition 1 proven by Fabra et alii (2005). In this latter work, the
results focus on critical thresholds of the market demand, which is treated
as a random variable. In our model, as D is deterministic, it is useful to
restate the price competition game outcomes in order to make clear the role
of capacity availability and ex-post demand regimes:
Lemma 1 The equilibrium proﬁts of the price competition game are as
follows:





πi =( e p − ci)Ki − Si = a,b e p ≤ b p,S ≥ 0. (1)
ii) for (D − Kb) ≤ Ka <
ζ




; ﬁrms’ mixed-strategy proﬁts are:
Eπa =( b p − ca)(D − Kb) ,E π b =( b p − cb)(D − Ka) (2)
iii) for
ζ
ζ−1(D−Kb) ≤ Ka <Dand Kb ≥ D, there is ex-post medium de-







πa =(ˆ p − ca)Ka ,π b =(ˆ p − cb)(D − Ka) (3)
iv) for Kb < D
ζ <D≤ Ka, there is ex-post medium demand regime with
the low-cost ﬁrm a having the capacity advantage (DM
a ); ﬁrms’ proﬁts are:
πa =(ˆ p − ca)(D − Kb) ,π b =(ˆ p − cb)Kb (4)
v) for Kb ≥ D
ζ and Ka >Dthere is ex-post low demand regime DL;
ﬁrms’ proﬁts are:
πa =( cb − ca)D,π b =0 (5)
8Proof. See the Appendix.
In the Appendix we show that for Ka ≤
ζ
ζ−1 (D − Kb) there exist two set
of pure strategy equilibria that are outcome equivalent to DM
a and DM
b .T h e
multiplicity of equilibria in the high demand regime creates some diﬃculties
for the analysis of capacity choice. Hereafter, we assume that in the ex-
post high demand regime, ﬁrms play in mixed strategies and their expected
proﬁts are given by equation (2) to preserve ﬁrms’ symmetry.10 Those proﬁts
corresponds to the limit case in which the high cost ﬁrm never bids the
price cap and the industry proﬁts are minimized (see Fabra et alii, 2005,
Proposition 1)11: this would discourage ﬁrms from creating ex-post high
demand regime.
Price game under eﬃcient tie-breaking Under the assumption that
the generators’ marginal costs are observable, an alternative rule to break
ties is eﬃciency: when ﬁrms bid the same price, the low cost ﬁrm is called
into operation ﬁrst, and the competitor is left serving the residual demand.
In our model, the introduction of the eﬃcient tie-breaking rule does not
aﬀect the equilibria of the price game, as the following shows:
Lemma 2 When the eﬃciency rule is used to break ties in oﬀer prices, the
price equilibrium and the proﬁts for all the competition regimes remain as
in Lemma 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Eﬃcient tie-breaking is not a remedy against high mark-up in the price
game, as potential advantages from calling ﬁrst into operation the low cost
ﬁrm are oﬀset by the uniform price mechanism with inelastic demand.
The plane of the declared capacities (Ka,K b) is partitioned in ﬁve zones.
Figure 1 summarizes ﬁrms’ proﬁts depending on the values of Ka and Kb
that we will consider in the capacity game below.
10Le Coq (2002) considers the two possible pure strategy equilibria.
11In the Appendix we show that a possible outcome of the high demand price game
in mixed strategy is the Bertrand equilibrium (see Corollary 1), but as both generators
must be despatched to serve the demand, the least eﬃcient ﬁrm is not excluded from the
market. In some sense, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is protected by the eﬃcient one against losses
due to low bids. This result should be taken into account when econometricians try to
evaluate the cost function using bid records. We also show (see Corollary 2) that capacities
play an important role in the characterization of the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance of
the mixed strategies.
9Figure 1: Proﬁts as functions of capacity declarations
4C a p a c i t y c h o i c e
To analyze the capacity game when demand is known by the operators at
the moment they announce their capacity availability, we start describing
the choice process when no generator is ex-ante constrained by capacity, and
then we extend the analysis to the cases of ex-ante medium and high demand
forecast. Recall that for the game in capacity, we assume that adding-up
the installed capacity of each ﬁrm is suﬃcient to provide the whole demand,
and that the low generation cost ﬁrm a is also for convenience the one with
the highest installed capacity.
4.1 Low demand
We ﬁrst consider the case where the ISO announces that demand will be
D<Kb, which means that both ﬁrms have enough capacity to supply the
whole demand individually.
As we can infer from Figure 1,
• if ﬁrm a thinks b will declare Kb ≥ D,f o rKa <Dshe will be in a
DM
b regime with proﬁt (b p − ca)Ka and for Ka ≥ D,s h ew i l lb ei na
DL regime with proﬁt (cb − ca)D which is independent from Ka;
10• if ﬁrm a thinks that b will declare D
ζ <K b <D ,w i t hKa <D−Kb,s h e
will be in the DE regime, earning πa =( e p−ca)Ka−S, which increases
with Ka and gives ﬁrm a the incentive to increase her capacity up to
Ka = D − Kb. With D − Kb ≤ Ka <
ζ
ζ−1 (D − Kb), she will be in
the DH regime, earning Eπa =( b p − ca)(D − Kb).F o r D>K a >
ζ
ζ−1 (D − Kb), she ends-up in a medium regime with proﬁte q u a lt o
πa =( b p−ca)Ka. Finally, increasing its capacity, for Ka ≥ D she will be
i nt h ee q u i v a l e n to fal o wd e m a n dr e g i m ew i t hp r o ﬁt (cb−ca)D. Clearly,
when D
ζ ≤ Kb <Dﬁrm a attains the highest proﬁtb yd e c l a r i n ga
capacity above the line Ka =
ζ
ζ−1 (D − Kb). Within this zone, ﬁrm a
earns πa =( b p − ca)Ka which increases with Ka;
• if ﬁrm a thinks that b will declare Kb = D
ζ ,w i t h0 ≤ Ka <Dshe
will be in an excess demand or high demand regime earning at most
πa =( b p−ca)(D−Kb). With Ka ≥ D, she will be in a DL-like regime,
earning πa =( cb − ca)D.
• if ﬁrm a thinks that b will declare Kb < D
ζ , with Ka <D− Kb,s h e
will be in the DE regime, earning πa =( e p−ca)Ka−S, which increases
with Ka and gives ﬁrm a the incentive to increase her capacity up to
Ka = D−Kb. With D−Kb <K a <D , she will be in the DH regime,
earning Eπa =( b p − ca)(D − Kb), and for larger values Ka >D ,she
will be in a DM
a regime, with proﬁt πa =( b p − ca)(D − Kb).
The comparison of the proﬁt values allows to establish that if ﬁrm a
thinks that b will declare Kb > D
ζ , she can avoid ﬁerce competition by
choosing D − ; for Kb ≤ D
ζ , the low demand regime is impossible, and ﬁrm
a bids any value above D − Kb.
Summarizing, the best response of ﬁrm a is as follows:
Ka(Kb)=
(






if Kb ≤ D
ζ
where   is a positive number arbitrarily small (see Figure 2).12
12Recall that we treat capacity as a continuos variable. In real electricity markets,
choosing a capacity level equal to D −   can be realized by shutting down the smallest
production unit that ensures total production by the generator at a level slightly below
the announced demand.
11Figure 2: Ex-ante low demand. Firm a’s best response function
in the capacity subgame.
The best response function of ﬁrm b is slightly diﬀerent.
• When Ka >D ,ﬁrm b will be in a low demand regime, earning nothing,
if he declares Kb ≥ D
ζ ; for capacity below D
ζ , ﬁrm b obtains a positive
proﬁt, πb =( b p−cb)Kb, which is the medium demand regime with ﬁrm
a having the capacity advantage.
• If ﬁrm b thinks that a will declare Ka = D,w i t h0 ≤ Kb <Dshe will
be in a DM
a regime earning πb =( b p − cb)Kb. With Kb ≥ D, she will
be in a DL regime, obtaining zero proﬁt.
• When Ka <D ,for Kb <D−Ka, she earns the excess demand proﬁt,
that is πb =( e p − cb)Kb − S. Hence ﬁrm b has an incentive to increase
capacity. For Kb ≥ D−Ka, ﬁrm b earns Eπb =( b p−cb)(D−Kb):this is
the proﬁt she obtains with the price equilibrium in mixed strategies in
the high demand regime, as well as with the price equilibrium in pure
strategies under the medium regime, where ﬁrm b has the capacity
advantage.
We can now characterize ﬁrm b’s best response (see Figure 3):
Kb(Ka)=
½ D






12Figure 3: Ex-ante low demand. Firm b’s best response in the
capacity subgame.
Consequently, we can establish the following:
Proposition 1 If none of the generators is naturally capacity constrained




b)={Ka,K bÁKa <D ,K b ≤ D
ζ ,K a + Kb ≥ D}
ii) K∗
a ≥ D, K∗
b = D
ζ −  
iii) K∗
a = D −  , K∗
b ≥ D
ζ
Proof. The proof is directly obtained by intersecting the two best response
functions.
Table 1 summarizes the results of Proposition 1.13
13T a b l e1( a sw e l la st h ef o l l o w i n gT a b l e s2a n d3 ) does not consider ex-ante “very-high-
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Table 1. Ex-ante low demand: subgame perfect equilibria
In type i) equilibria, we are in an ex-post high demand regime. The
two other sets of equilibria give medium demand regime. In type ii) with
ﬁrm a having an advantage in capacity, the expected proﬁts are respectively
π∗






b =( b p − cb)D
ζ . In type iii) equilibria, proﬁts
are π∗
a =( b p − ca)D , π∗
b =0 .
It is unfortunately impossible to eliminate some of the equilibria by a
Pareto-dominance argument: each generator is better-oﬀ when the other one
has the advantage in capacity and ﬁxes the SMP at b p. Moreover, generator
i prefers to sell all capacity in the DM
j regime than earning the DH proﬁt
with only one fraction of the demand.
These remarks imply that mixed strategies equilibria are very likely in
the capacity game and there is a strong incentive for generators to agree on
market sharing. If the players can coordinate their capacity bids somewhere
in the set K∗
a + K∗
b = D, generator a who has a cost advantage can use the
credible threat to bid K∗
a = D that guarantees at worst πa =( cb − ca)D
in order to obtain a capacity advantage and the consequent proﬁta d v a n -
tage. Consequently she will deny any agreement such that K∗
a ≤ cb−ca





D. All these implicit or explicit agreements are obviously forbidden.
But the model shows that the high mark-up resulting from the uniform price
system gives strong incentives to transform a natural low demand regime into
a medium or high demand regime by withholding capacities.
144.2 Medium and High demands
When Kb and Ka become binding, leading to natural medium and high
demand regimes, some equilibria of the preceding section are eliminated.
However, given that ﬁrm b’s reaction functions switches at D
ζ , there is an
additional degree of freedom: even when “naturally” capacity-constrained
(i.e. Kb <D ), the small ﬁrm can still have an actually unconstrained best
reaction function. For example, if the ISO announces an ex-ante medium
demand regime, the capacity constraint of generator b puts downward pres-
sure to ﬁrms’ choice only if Kb is lower than D
ζ , as the following Proposition
points out (see Table 2):
Proposition 2 When the smaller generator is naturally constrained and
the larger is not (Kb <D<Ka), the equilibria of the capacity game are as
follows:
i) if Kb < D
ζ , the equilibria are (K∗
a,K∗
b)={Ka,K bÁKa <D ,K b < D
ζ ,
Ka + Kb ≥ D};
ii) if D
ζ ≤ Kb, there are three families of equilibria:
1) (K∗
a,K∗
b)={Ka,K bÁKa <D ,K b ≤ D
ζ ,K a + Kb ≥ D}
2) K∗
a ≥ D, K∗
b = D
ζ −  
3) K∗
a = D −  , D
ζ <K ∗
b
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Table 2. Ex-ante medium demand: subgame perfect equilibria
15If the small generator is severely capacity constrained, only high demand
equilibria arise. If, despite the capacity constraint, ﬁrm b can bid D
ζ (or
slightly less), all the outcomes of Proposition 1 are likely, though now, as
Kb <D ,the medium demand regime with b having the capacity advantage
disappears.
In any case, the set of conﬂicting Pareto superior equilibria is reduced
to the segment K∗
a + K∗





. If generators could agree
on capacity bids, we have seen at the end of Section 4.1 that ﬁrm a could






D.A sn o wKb < D
ζ ,t h ee ﬃcient negotiation set
would be reduced at the advantage of a, s i n c ea tw o r s ts h ec o u l do b t a i nt h e
low regime proﬁt.
Similarly to the previous case, when the ISO announces a natural DH
regime, only strategic high demand and excess demand regimes are feasible
ex-post. The deﬁnition of the equilibrium set depends on whether Kb lies
below or above D
ζ .
Proposition 3 If both generators are naturally constrained (Kb < Ka <
D<Ka + Kb), the equilibria of the capacity game are:
(K∗
a,K∗





,K a + Kb ≥ D}
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1.
Table 3 summarizes the results of Proposition 3.
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Table 3. Ex-ante high demand: subgame perfect equilibria
164.3 Capacity withholding
The outcome of our two-stage game suggests several results regarding the
strategic withholding of production capacity. When demand is “naturally”
low, the players face the largest set of possibilities. They could even restrict
their capacities to create artiﬁcial scarcity. Common sense suggest that, if
penalties for energy shortage were very severe (e.g. leaving generators with
zero proﬁts), their interest would be to avoid an ex-post excess demand
regime. But, they also want to avoid the ex-post low demand regime that
would create ﬁerce competition. Consequently, the outcome of the game
will be ex-post high or medium demand regimes. At least one of the players
withhold capacity; both do so in the ex-post high demand regime.
When the ISO announces an ex-ante medium demand regime, at equilib-
rium the ex-post high demand regime may occur, implying that generators
can strategically restrain capacity. If the low generator is severely con-
strained, the high demand equilibrium is the only possible outcome of the
game.
Clearly, absent any capacity cost, withholding is very likely as it is weakly
Pareto superior for ﬁrms. The only case where both ﬁrms might dump their
i n s t a l l e dc a p a c i t yo nt h em a r k e t ,b yb i d d i n gK∗
a = Ka and K∗
b = Kb, is
when both generators are ex-ante constrained. However, ﬁrm b will surely
withhold if it can bid K∗
b = D
ζ (that is, when D>Kb ≥ D
ζ ). If there was no
cost-advantage (i.e. ζ =1 ) , this case would not arise.
More generally, when ﬁrms are symmetric, the set of equilibria is smaller.14
Although capacity withholding is still likely to occur, there is one exception:
when the ex-post regime is medium demand with a having the capacity ad-
vantage, ﬁrm b never restrains capacity. In fact, leaving a to be the market
leader reduces the opportunities for b to use capacity bids strategically.
As also Ubeda (2004) notices, when endogenizing capacity in a two-stage
game with uniform auctions and inelastic demand, there is multiplicity of
equilibria in terms of capacities, though uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium
price which is just the monopoly price, that is b p. However, it is impossible
to eliminate the subgame equilibria using a Pareto dominance argument.
Certainly, the set K∗
a+K∗
b = D (with or without K∗
i ≤ Ki) is very attractive
for the generators. The range of capacities allows for the possibility of
using ﬁnite horizon trigger strategies to condition the subgame equilibrium
selection on the capacities chosen. This may possibly allow for collusion to
be enforced in equilibrium (see Decheneaux and Kovenock, 2004). However,
14One can easily see that, when both ﬁrms have symmetric unit costs equal to c,i nt h e
price game, Betrand equilibria arise only when the demand is low. For medium and high
demand regimes, two symmetric subsets of pure strategy equilibria with one ﬁrm bidding
high and the competitor bidding low exist (the “medium-like” demand regime does not
exist). The mixed strategy equilibrium gives the same expected proﬁtf o rb o t hﬁrms, and
the support of the prices over which ﬁrms randomize is [c, e p]. In the capacity game, ﬁrms’
reaction functions become symmetric and both switch at capacity values equal to D.
17the characterization of those equilibria goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, it appears that capacity bids are always suﬃcient to match the
demand: there is no incentive to organize voluntary power shortage. Actu-
ally, the results of Proposition 1 to 3 are independent of the values of e p and
S. E v e ni nt h ec a s eo faz e r op e n a l t y ,t h a ti sw i t he p = b p and S =0 , neither
ﬁrm has the incentive to create the excess demand regime. We conclude
that power shortage can only occur due to unexpected variation of demand
or costs, or to strategic long-term reasons (e.g. lack of investment) that are
beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Capacity competition and uniform auctions
That competition between capacity constrained ﬁrms generally yields a mar-
ket price above marginal cost and therefore positive proﬁts is not surprising:
decreasing returns to scale soften price competition, as Bertrand-Edgeworth
(henceforth, B-E) models have shown. This is not the place to review sys-
tematically these models (for a very interesting synthesis, see Vives, 1999,
chapter 5). We simply recall here all the elements that can be useful in
comparing the results of our model to this literature.
The B-E models describe price competition, under the hypothesis that
1) the scale of the ﬁrm is given, as production decisions adjust to demand;
2) each ﬁrm takes into account that the competitor will not sell more than
its competitive proﬁt-maximizing supply at the announces price. Therefore,
when one ﬁrm puts a price lower than the competitor’s, she gets all the
consumers that can buy at the set price; if she names a price higher than the
competitor’s, she can face a positive residual demand, since the competitor
sells the minimum between its residual demand and its competitive supply
(unlike the Bertrand competition mode l ,w h e r ea l lc o n s u m e r sa r es e r v e db y
the low-price ﬁrm). The residual demand is then allocated according to a
rationing rule.
The B-E models predict that in those markets where ﬁrms have high
capacities relative to demand, there is a unique pure strategy market equi-
librium, the competitive price, whereas when ﬁrms are relatively small, there
exists only a mixed strategy equilibrium where high prices (stochastically)
prevail.1516 These models also predict that large ﬁrms will tend to set
low prices. These predictions could have been obtained also from Cournot
15The existence of mixed strategy equilibria is guaranteed under relatively weak as-
sumptions (demand continuous and equal to zero for large prices, strictly convex costs,
see Maskin, 1986, Allen and Hellwig, 1986).
16Moreno and Ubeda (2004) introduce a simple model of oligopolistic competition where
ﬁrms ﬁrst build capacity, and then choose a reservation price at which they are willing to
supply their capacities.They show that in this new model every pure strategy equilibrium
yields the Cournot outcome, and that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a pure
strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.
18games, in particular from the Kreps-Scheinkmann (1983) model, a two-stage
game where ﬁrms decide ﬁrst their scale and then compete in prices to their
supply limits.
To which extent the predictions of our model coincide with those of the
capacity constrained literature?
First, all the subgame perfect equilibria we obtain are characterized by
productive ineﬃciency, in the sense that the price is not the competitive one
and does not correctly signal the proﬁt from entry. Though in the price sub-
game we do obtain a result which is similar to the B-E models (indeed, when
demand is low, the equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost), this com-
petitive eﬀect is oﬀset by the capacity game. Moreover, the price subgame
exhibits multiple pure strategy equilibria under all the demand regimes, as
Fabra and alii (2005) have also shown.
Second, regarding allocative eﬃciency, although the multiplicity of equi-
libria prevents to conclude in full generality, in all the medium and medium-
high demand regimes, the large ﬁrm sets high prices, contrary to the ﬁndings
of B-E models. It implies that when the high-cost/low installed capacity ﬁrm
b is left without the capacity advantage, she will be called into operation
ﬁrst, which is clearly undesirable. When ex-post high demand regime occurs,
allocative eﬃciency is even more diﬃcult to assess: using the mixed-strategy
price equilibrium proﬁts, we know that stochastically, the smaller ﬁrms can
bid larger prices; when the small ﬁrm is the ineﬃcient one, then ﬁrm b sells
all of her capacity, so compromising allocative eﬃciency.
Third, although our model predicts a market price well above marginal
costs, both ﬁrms producing at capacity is only one of the possible outcomes
of the game: this equilibrium may arise in the ex-ante high demand regime,
that is when total installed capacity is small relative to the market size and
generators might not play strategically. This is similar to Kreps-Scheinkman
(1983) model.
The roots of these relative diﬀerences between our model and the capacity-
constrained competition literature have to be found in some crucial hypoth-
esis we have made. First, we model the price-stage game as a uniform
auction which has clearly an impact on the equilibrium price; second, and
most importantly, inelastic demand creates strong incentives for ﬁrms to bid
the highest attainable price. These assumptions strongly limit competition
for the residual demand and subgame perfect equilibria leave no room at all
to marginal cost pricing. Moreover, though in the high demand regime our
results on the relationship between large ﬁrms and high prices contradict
the stochastic dominance obtained in B-E models, this is less crucial in our
model, as it impacts allocative eﬃciency but not the market price (the SMP
is the price cap, whatever the bidding behavior of the ﬁrms).
Finally, notice that most of the subgame equilibria are not characterized
by ﬁrms producing at full capacity. In our model, ﬁrms decide on capacity
availability (which comes at zero costs) and not on their scale (that is,
19installed capacity) which would involve very high ﬁxed costs. Therefore,
there is no discrepancy between the ﬁrst-period (ex-ante) cost and the second
period (ex-post) cost, implying that there is no incentive to dump existing
capacity ex-post. Most importantly, in this model with uniform price and
inelastic demand, the equilibrium price jumps to the price-cap as soon as
at least one ﬁrm is unable to serve the demand. Therefore, ﬁrms withhold
capacity to earn scarcity rents. Moreover, the less the ﬁrms are “naturally”
capacity constrained (that is, in the ex-ante low and ex-ante medium demand
regimes), the stronger the incentive to withhold. This explains the main
diﬀerence between our results, especially in the ex-ante low demand regime,
and those of the literature on endogenous capacity choice.
5.1 Cost asymmetry
Cost asymmetry plays a very important role in capacity-constrained compe-
tition models. The only model that analyzes Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
with unit cost asymmetries is Deneckere and Kovenock (1996). As an appli-
cation of their characterization, they examine the Kreps-Sheinkmann model
of capacity choice followed by Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition with
elastic demand and eﬃcient rationing. Obtaining closed-form solutions for
such a game is not trivial. Deneckere and Kovenock ﬁnd that if the cost of ca-
pacity is negligible, when the high-cost ﬁrm’s capacity is not too large, the
low-cost ﬁrm best response coincides with the downward-sloping Cournot
best response. When the high cost ﬁrm’s capacity reaches a critical level
(which depends on the unit production costs of both ﬁrms), the low-cost
ﬁrm’s best response becomes ﬂat and jumps to a capacity level that would
allow her to accommodate all demand and to price its rival out in the price
subgame, yielding a more competitive outcome, with capacities above the
Cournot level. Therefore, Cournot capacity levels only arise for limited cost
pairs/capacity combinations and demand functions: as compared with the
symmetric case, the low-cost ﬁrm has a greater incentive to price its rival
out.17 As the cost of capacity becomes larger, the range of unit cost up to
capacity for which Cournot does not hold becomes smaller.
The application developed by Deneckere and Kovenock is quite similar to
our ex ante low demand regime. Recall that if the capacity made available
by the high-cost ﬁrm is below a critical value (namely, Kb ≤ D/ζ), the
low-cost ﬁrm best reaction function is any capacity level above the value
that avoid shortages, and, for Kb >D / ζ , ﬁrm a accommodates almost all
the demand. The behavior of the high-cost ﬁrm is similar, but her reaction
function switches at the upper frontier of the Bertrand competition, that is
17If the critical capacity level is below the intersection of the Cournot ﬁrms reaction func-
tions, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Also note that Deneckere and Kovenock
make ad hoc assumptions to avoid the high-cost ﬁrm having the same incentive to engage
in price competition.
20at D/ζ.
The shape of the reaction functions in our model is diﬀerent from De-
neckere and Kovenock because of the price subgame, as already stated. But
the most crucial point is that for values above the critical capacity of the
competitor, ﬁrms can avoid serving all the demand, because this would lead
to Bertrand competition. By undercutting slightly the demand level, they
create the asymmetry in capacity that ensures a high pay-oﬀ, since when one
ﬁrm is unable to serve all demand, the market price is equal to the price cap.
If in our model ﬁrms were symmetric, this anticompetitive eﬀect would still
arise, but in a more limited space, as both ﬁrms’ reaction function would
switch at D.
On a more technical ground, unit-cost asymmetries also modify the sup-
port of the mixed strategies. As in Deneckere and Kovenock (1996), we ﬁnd
that the support of mixed strategies is not the same for the two ﬁrms. An-
other analogy can be found with Allen and Hellwig (1993), who ﬁnd that,
given the set of competitive prices at which market demand is equal to ag-
gregate production capacity, in equilibrium asymmetric ﬁrms do not charge
prices below the highest competitive price. This is similar to our result that
the system marginal price does not fall below the cost of the least eﬃcient
ﬁrm.
5.2 Rationing
In B-E models, the rationing rule18 used to allocate residual demand can
drastically change 1) the region where a pure strategy equilibrium exists19
and 2) the characterization of mixed strategies.20 More drastically, the
Kreps-Sheinkmann (1983) result is not robust to departures from the eﬃ-
cient rationing rule if the cost of capacity is zero. With proportional ra-
tioning, the equilibrium tends to be more competitive, with excess capacity
18Edgeworth used proportional rationing, that is the low-price ﬁrm serves the maxi-
mum between zero and a random sample of the consumer population (rationing is made
through a queuing system). Levitan and Shubick (1972) proposed the surplus-maximizing
or eﬃcient rule, where the low price ﬁrm sells an amount equal to its competitive supply
and the high price ﬁrm serves the diﬀerence between the demand that clears at the high
price less the consumers satisﬁed by the low price ﬁrm.
19The region where a pure strategy equilibrium exists is restricted under eﬃcient ra-
tioning.
20For instance, in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), with elastic demand, eﬃcient rationing,
symmetric unit production costs and asymmetric (costly) capacities, ﬁrms expected proﬁts
are asymmetric. The expected revenue of the largest ﬁrm is the reduced form of the
Cournot proﬁts: this serves as foundation for Cournot equilibrium in the two stage games.
In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the larger ﬁrm charges higher prices in a stochastic
sense. Under the same hypothesis, but using eﬃcient rationing, Vives (1999) shows that
the expected proﬁts and the upper bound of the support are analogous to those we obtain
in the mixed strategy equilibria (except that in our model demand is inelastic, hence the
upper bound is the price cap, and that the proﬁt will be net of marginal production costs).
21with respect to the Cournot level (Davidson and Deneckere, 1986). If the
cost of capacity is small, then the Cournot equilibrium cannot be an equilib-
rium outcome of the two stage game if the rationing rule is not the eﬃcient
one (see Tirole, 1988, Section 5.7).
Our results are independent from the demand rationing assumption.
With uniform auctions the market price is unique, and the merit-order pro-
cedure only changes the allocation of supply. Allowing the ﬁrm that has
quoted the lowest price to serve ﬁrst is equivalent to the eﬃcient rationing
allocation. However one can easily verify that, with inelastic demand, eﬃ-
cient and proportional rationing collapse into the same allocation rule. Also
notice that the excess demand regime is never an equilibrium outcome, then
we do not have to consider rules to ration unserved customers.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Our analysis provides interesting insights into the functioning of electricity
spot markets. We have shown that market power enforced by strategic
withholding is quite likely when the ISO announces ex-ante low and medium
demand regimes. Given that ex-ante there is excess capacity, at least one
ﬁrm withholds capacity and this opportunistic behavior creates artiﬁcially
high mark-ups that do not reﬂect scarcity rents. The uniform pricing rule
makes even more appealing the gains from capacity withholding: when ﬁrms
restrict capacity, the SMP attains its maximum level, and so do scarcity
rents. However, this strategic behavior does not result in black-outs.
Market design rules, such as the uniform auction, as well as market
characteristics, such as demand inelasticity, can facilitate capacity with-
holding by generators. To this extent, an interesting extension of the model
would be to compare incentives to withhold capacity under alternative auc-
tion formats, namely considering a price subgame where ﬁrms are paid the
price they bid, like in discriminatory auctions. However, the task of analyz-
ing withholding in electricity markets must include the interaction between
spot trading and other markets: in particular, one has to consider whether
capacity is declared unavailable because of strategic withholding or for tech-
nical reason, or with the intent to provide ancillary services, or because it is
constrained down due to transmission congestion or environmental output
restrictions.
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257A p p e n d i x
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Excess demand regime DE When total supply is insuﬃcient to serve
the market (D>K a + Kb), ﬁrms proﬁts are calculate according to the
shortage penalty rule (see Section 2.2).
High demand regime DH
Equilibria in pure strategies Referring to Lemma 1 in Fabra et alii
(2005), equilibria in pure strategies are
i) if Ka ≤
ζ
ζ−1 (D − Kb), there exist two symmetric sets of equilibria in pure
strategies, where the low cost ﬁrm bids the price cap and the competitor




b = b p (6)




= cb +(b p − cb)
(D − Ka)
Kb
>c a, and the second set is:
B∗
a = b p, B∗
b ∈ [0,γH
b ] (8)








ii) if Ka >
ζ
ζ−1(D − Kb) there exist one set of equilibria where ﬁrm b bids
the price cap and ﬁrm a bids below a given threshold. For values of Ka >
ζ
ζ−1(D − Kb), it is easy to check that γH
b <c b; Therefore, there is only one
set of equilibria, described by equations (6) and (7), where ﬁrm b bids high.
Equilibria in mixed strategies Equilibria in mixed strategies are
derived by Fabra et alii (2005), in the proof of Proposition 1, to which we
add two additional results.
Corollary 1 The system marginal price cannot be lower than the marginal
cost of the least-eﬃcient ﬁrm.
Proof. In the high demand regime, the SMP is ﬁxed by the highest bidder.
Even if ﬁrm b can bid on the interval [ca,c b] with a positive probability, the
SMP will be above cb with zero probability, since ﬁrm a bids below the
marginal cost of the competitor with zero probability.
Corollary 2 Ka <K b is a suﬃcient condition for Ga(B) ≤ Gb(B) ∀B.
26Proof. Straightforward calculations show that Ka < (>)Kb ⇐⇒ δa > (<
)δb. Under the hypothesis ca <c b, it is always true that for B<b p:
B − ca
b p − ca
>
B − cb
b p − cb
(10)
Hence Ka <K b is suﬃcient to determine the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
Ga(B) ≤ Gb(B).
Medium demand regime DM
b When Kb ≥ D>K b,d r a w i n go nt h e
Lemma 1 proven by Fabra and alii (2005), we can state that price equilibria
of the medium demand regime are B∗
b =ˆ p, B∗
a ∈ [0,γM




cb +(ˆ p − cb)D−Ka
D >c a. All the price equilibria give the same proﬁts πa =
(ˆ p − ca)Ka,πb =(ˆ p − cb)(D − Ka).
Medium demand regime DM
a Similarly to the previous case, when
Ka >D>K b and Kb ≤ D
ζ , the equilibria are B∗
a =ˆ p, B∗
b ∈ [0,γM







>c b.F i r m s ’p r o ﬁts are: πa =(ˆ p−ca)(D−Kb),
πb =(ˆ p − cb)Kb.
Low demand regime DL In the ex-post low demand situation, as the
ﬁrms propose a perfectly homogeneous good, we have pure Bertrand com-
petition (see again Fabra et alii, Lemma 1). Recalling that the parameter
ζ =
ˆ p−ca
ˆ p−cb > 1 measures ﬁrm a’s cost advantage, one can easily check that
Kb > D
ζ is equivalent to (ˆ p−ca)(D−Kb) < (cb−ca)D or γM
b <c b.Thus when
Ka >D>K b and Kb > D
ζ , given that γM
b <c b, ﬁrm b should bid below
her marginal cost to be in the market. Therefore, ﬁrm a will not consider
this bid as a credible threat. Firm a undercuts the rival’s cost by bidding
cb−  and the equilibrium outcome is the Bertrand equilibrium. Equilibrium
bids are B∗
a = cb − ε,B∗
b = cb and proﬁts πa =( cb − ca)D, πb =0 .21
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Under the low demand regime, the eﬃcient ﬁrm does not need to undercut
h e rc o m p e t i t o r ’ sb i d st oo b t a i nt he whole demand. Equilibrium proﬁts are
the same as in Lemma 1.
Under medium demand regime, for Ka >D>K b, ﬁrms’ proﬁts are like
in (??), except for Ba = Bb, w h e r ew en o wh a v e :
πER
a =( Ba − ca)D,π ER
b =0 if Ba = Bb (11)
21In real markets, ε is the smallest tick below cb ﬁxed by the rules of the market. Here,
we simply assume that it is an arbitrary small number, so that the low-cost ﬁrm a wins
the whole market and the SMP is cb. In markets where a tick is enforced, we would have
B
∗
a = Max{cb −ε,ca} = SMP. The existence of the tick could sensitively lower generator
a’s proﬁt, especially when the diﬀerence between the marginal costs is not very large.
27where ER refers to the eﬃciency rule. The proﬁts in (11) coincide with
those earned by the ﬁrms when Ba <B b, hence the price equilibrium is
unchanged.
In the high demand regime, when ﬁrms play pure strategies, bidding the
same price as the competitor is a strongly dominated strategy for generator
b and a weakly dominated strategy for generator a (both when Ka >K b
and when Ka <K b). Therefore, we can eliminate it. Finally, adopting the
eﬃciency rule does not aﬀect mixed strategy equilibria when calculated on
a continuous support, because the joint probability of ending up on a single
point is of zero measure (this is no longer true when there exists a legal tick
that constraints the choice of the bids’ format).
28